pomerium/authenticate/middleware.go
bdd 56c89e8653
Improve test coverage. (#8)
* Improve test coverage.
* Remove unused http status code argument from SignInPageMethod.
* Removed log package in internal packages.
* Add test to check https scheme is used for authorization url.
* Add unit tests for global logging package.
2019-01-11 13:49:28 -10:00

109 lines
2.9 KiB
Go

package authenticate // import "github.com/pomerium/pomerium/authenticate"
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/httputil"
)
var defaultSignatureValidityDuration = 5 * time.Minute
// validateRedirectURI checks the redirect uri in the query parameters and ensures that
// the url's domain is one in the list of proxy root domains.
func validateRedirectURI(f http.HandlerFunc, proxyRootDomains []string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
redirectURI := req.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
if !validRedirectURI(redirectURI, proxyRootDomains) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, "Invalid redirect parameter", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
f(rw, req)
}
}
func validRedirectURI(uri string, rootDomains []string) bool {
if uri == "" || len(rootDomains) == 0 {
return false
}
redirectURL, err := url.Parse(uri)
if err != nil || redirectURL.Host == "" {
return false
}
for _, domain := range rootDomains {
if domain == "" {
return false
}
if strings.HasSuffix(redirectURL.Hostname(), domain) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func validateSignature(f http.HandlerFunc, sharedKey string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
redirectURI := req.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
sigVal := req.Form.Get("sig")
timestamp := req.Form.Get("ts")
if !validSignature(redirectURI, sigVal, timestamp, sharedKey) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, "Invalid redirect parameter", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
f(rw, req)
}
}
// validateSignature ensures the validity of the redirect url by comparing the hmac
// digest, and ensuring that the included timestamp is fresh
func validSignature(redirectURI, sigVal, timestamp, secret string) bool {
if redirectURI == "" || sigVal == "" || timestamp == "" || secret == "" {
return false
}
_, err := url.Parse(redirectURI)
if err != nil {
return false
}
requestSig, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(sigVal)
if err != nil {
return false
}
i, err := strconv.ParseInt(timestamp, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return false
}
tm := time.Unix(i, 0)
if time.Now().Sub(tm) > defaultSignatureValidityDuration {
return false
}
localSig := redirectURLSignature(redirectURI, tm, secret)
return hmac.Equal(requestSig, localSig)
}
// redirectURLSignature generates a hmac digest from a
// redirect url, a timestamp, and a secret.
func redirectURLSignature(rawRedirect string, timestamp time.Time, secret string) []byte {
h := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret))
h.Write([]byte(rawRedirect))
h.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprint(timestamp.Unix())))
return h.Sum(nil)
}