mirror of
https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium.git
synced 2025-04-28 18:06:34 +02:00
550 lines
18 KiB
Go
550 lines
18 KiB
Go
package authenticate
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/gorilla/mux"
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"github.com/rs/cors"
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"github.com/pomerium/csrf"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/authenticateflow"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/handlers"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/httputil"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/log"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/middleware"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/sessions"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/telemetry/trace"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/urlutil"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/pkg/cryptutil"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/pkg/identity"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/pkg/identity/oidc"
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)
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// Handler returns the authenticate service's handler chain.
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func (a *Authenticate) Handler() http.Handler {
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r := httputil.NewRouter()
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a.Mount(r)
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return r
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}
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// Mount mounts the authenticate routes to the given router.
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func (a *Authenticate) Mount(r *mux.Router) {
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r.StrictSlash(true)
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r.Use(middleware.SetHeaders(httputil.HeadersContentSecurityPolicy))
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r.Use(func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
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options := a.options.Load()
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state := a.state.Load()
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csrfKey := fmt.Sprintf("%s_csrf", options.CookieName)
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csrfOptions := []csrf.Option{
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csrf.Secure(true),
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csrf.Path("/"),
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csrf.UnsafePaths(
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[]string{
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"/oauth2/callback", // rfc6749#section-10.12 accepts GET
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}),
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csrf.FormValueName("state"), // rfc6749#section-10.12
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csrf.CookieName(csrfKey),
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csrf.FieldName(csrfKey),
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csrf.ErrorHandler(httputil.HandlerFunc(httputil.CSRFFailureHandler)),
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csrf.SameSite(options.GetCSRFSameSite()),
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}
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return csrf.Protect(state.cookieSecret, csrfOptions...)(h)
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})
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// redirect / to /.pomerium/
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r.Path("/").Handler(http.RedirectHandler("/.pomerium/", http.StatusFound))
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r.Path("/robots.txt").HandlerFunc(a.RobotsTxt).Methods(http.MethodGet)
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// Identity Provider (IdP) endpoints
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r.Path("/oauth2/callback").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(a.OAuthCallback)).Methods(http.MethodGet, http.MethodPost)
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a.mountDashboard(r)
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) mountDashboard(r *mux.Router) {
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sr := httputil.DashboardSubrouter(r)
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c := cors.New(cors.Options{
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AllowOriginRequestFunc: func(r *http.Request, _ string) bool {
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state := a.state.Load()
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err := state.flow.VerifyAuthenticateSignature(r)
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if err == nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Info().Msg("authenticate: signed URL, adding CORS headers")
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}
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return err == nil
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},
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AllowCredentials: true,
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AllowedHeaders: []string{"*"},
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})
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sr.Use(c.Handler)
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sr.Use(a.RetrieveSession)
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// routes that don't need a session:
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sr.Path("/sign_out").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(a.SignOut))
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sr.Path("/signed_out").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(a.signedOut)).Methods(http.MethodGet)
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// routes that need a session:
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sr = sr.NewRoute().Subrouter()
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sr.Use(a.VerifySession)
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sr.Path("/").Handler(a.requireValidSignatureOnRedirect(a.userInfo))
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sr.Path("/sign_in").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(a.SignIn))
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sr.Path("/device-enrolled").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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handlers.DeviceEnrolled(a.getUserInfoData(r)).ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return nil
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}))
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cr := sr.PathPrefix("/callback").Subrouter()
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cr.Path("/").Handler(a.requireValidSignature(a.Callback)).Methods(http.MethodGet)
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}
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// RetrieveSession is the middleware used retrieve session by the sessionLoader
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func (a *Authenticate) RetrieveSession(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return sessions.RetrieveSession(a.state.Load().sessionLoader)(next)
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}
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// VerifySession is the middleware used to enforce a valid authentication
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// session state is attached to the users's request context.
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func (a *Authenticate) VerifySession(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return httputil.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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ctx, span := trace.StartSpan(r.Context(), "authenticate.VerifySession")
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defer span.End()
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state := a.state.Load()
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idpID := a.getIdentityProviderIDForRequest(r)
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sessionState, err := a.getSessionFromCtx(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Info().
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Err(err).
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Str("idp_id", idpID).
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Msg("authenticate: session load error")
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return a.reauthenticateOrFail(w, r, err)
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}
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if sessionState.IdentityProviderID != idpID {
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log.FromRequest(r).Info().
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Str("idp_id", idpID).
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Str("session_idp_id", sessionState.IdentityProviderID).
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Str("id", sessionState.ID).
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Msg("authenticate: session not associated with identity provider")
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return a.reauthenticateOrFail(w, r, err)
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}
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if err := state.flow.VerifySession(ctx, r, sessionState); err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Info().
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Err(err).
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Str("idp_id", idpID).
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Msg("authenticate: couldn't verify session")
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return a.reauthenticateOrFail(w, r, err)
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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return nil
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})
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}
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// RobotsTxt handles the /robots.txt route.
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func (a *Authenticate) RobotsTxt(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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fmt.Fprintf(w, "User-agent: *\nDisallow: /")
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}
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// SignIn handles authenticating a user.
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func (a *Authenticate) SignIn(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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ctx, span := trace.StartSpan(r.Context(), "authenticate.SignIn")
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defer span.End()
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state := a.state.Load()
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s, err := a.getSessionFromCtx(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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state.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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return err
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}
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return state.flow.SignIn(w, r, s)
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}
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// SignOut signs the user out and attempts to revoke the user's identity session
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// Handles both GET and POST.
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func (a *Authenticate) SignOut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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// check for an HMAC'd URL. If none is found, show a confirmation page.
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err := a.state.Load().flow.VerifyAuthenticateSignature(r)
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if err != nil {
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authenticateURL, err := a.options.Load().GetAuthenticateURL()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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handlers.SignOutConfirm(handlers.SignOutConfirmData{
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URL: urlutil.SignOutURL(r, authenticateURL, a.state.Load().sharedKey),
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BrandingOptions: a.options.Load().BrandingOptions,
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}).ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return nil
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}
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// otherwise actually do the sign out
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return a.signOutRedirect(w, r)
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) signOutRedirect(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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ctx, span := trace.StartSpan(r.Context(), "authenticate.SignOut")
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defer span.End()
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options := a.options.Load()
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idpID := a.getIdentityProviderIDForRequest(r)
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authenticator, err := a.cfg.getIdentityProvider(options, idpID)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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rawIDToken := a.revokeSession(ctx, w, r)
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authenticateURL, err := options.GetAuthenticateURL()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("error getting authenticate url: %w", err)
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}
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signOutRedirectURL, err := options.GetSignOutRedirectURL()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var signOutURL string
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if uri := r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryRedirectURI); uri != "" {
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signOutURL = uri
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} else if signOutRedirectURL != nil {
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signOutURL = signOutRedirectURL.String()
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}
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authenticateSignedOutURL := authenticateURL.ResolveReference(&url.URL{
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Path: "/.pomerium/signed_out",
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}).String()
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if err := authenticator.SignOut(w, r, rawIDToken, authenticateSignedOutURL, signOutURL); err == nil {
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return nil
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} else if !errors.Is(err, oidc.ErrSignoutNotImplemented) {
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log.Ctx(r.Context()).Error().Err(err).Msg("authenticate: failed to get sign out url for authenticator")
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}
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// if the authenticator failed to sign out, and no sign out url is defined, just go to the signed out page
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if signOutURL == "" {
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signOutURL = authenticateSignedOutURL
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}
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httputil.Redirect(w, r, signOutURL, http.StatusFound)
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return nil
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) signedOut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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handlers.SignedOut(handlers.SignedOutData{
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BrandingOptions: a.options.Load().BrandingOptions,
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}).ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return nil
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}
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// reauthenticateOrFail starts the authenticate process by redirecting the
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// user to their respective identity provider. This function also builds the
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// 'state' parameter which is encrypted and includes authenticating data
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// for validation.
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// If the request is a `xhr/ajax` request (e.g the `X-Requested-With` header)
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// is set do not redirect but instead return 401 unauthorized.
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//
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// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0-final.html#AuthRequest
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.2.1
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// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/XMLHttpRequest
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func (a *Authenticate) reauthenticateOrFail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) error {
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// If request AJAX/XHR request, return a 401 instead because the redirect
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// will almost certainly violate their CORs policy
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if reqType := r.Header.Get("X-Requested-With"); strings.EqualFold(reqType, "XmlHttpRequest") {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusUnauthorized, err)
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}
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state := a.state.Load()
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options := a.options.Load()
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idpID := a.getIdentityProviderIDForRequest(r)
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authenticator, err := a.cfg.getIdentityProvider(options, idpID)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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state.flow.LogAuthenticateEvent(r)
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state.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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redirectURL := state.redirectURL.ResolveReference(r.URL)
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nonce := csrf.Token(r)
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now := time.Now().Unix()
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b := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s|%d|", nonce, now))
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enc := cryptutil.Encrypt(state.cookieCipher, []byte(redirectURL.String()), b)
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b = append(b, enc...)
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encodedState := base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
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err = authenticator.SignIn(w, r, encodedState)
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusInternalServerError,
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fmt.Errorf("failed to sign in: %w", err))
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}
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return nil
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}
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// OAuthCallback handles the callback from the identity provider.
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//
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// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#CodeFlowSteps
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// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#AuthResponse
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func (a *Authenticate) OAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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redirect, err := a.getOAuthCallback(w, r)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("authenticate.OAuthCallback: %w", err)
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}
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httputil.Redirect(w, r, redirect.String(), http.StatusFound)
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return nil
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) statusForErrorCode(errorCode string) int {
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switch errorCode {
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case "access_denied", "unauthorized_client":
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return http.StatusUnauthorized
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default:
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return http.StatusBadRequest
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}
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) getOAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {
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ctx, span := trace.StartSpan(r.Context(), "authenticate.getOAuthCallback")
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defer span.End()
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state := a.state.Load()
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options := a.options.Load()
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// Error Authentication Response: rfc6749#section-4.1.2.1 & OIDC#3.1.2.6
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//
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// first, check if the identity provider returned an error
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if idpError := r.FormValue("error"); idpError != "" {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(a.statusForErrorCode(idpError), fmt.Errorf("identity provider: %v", idpError))
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}
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// fail if no session redemption code is returned
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code := r.FormValue("code")
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if code == "" {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("identity provider returned empty code"))
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}
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// state includes a csrf nonce (validated by middleware) and redirect uri
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bytes, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(r.FormValue("state"))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("bad bytes: %w", err))
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}
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// split state into concat'd components
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// (nonce|timestamp|redirect_url|encrypted_data(redirect_url)+mac(nonce,ts))
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statePayload := strings.SplitN(string(bytes), "|", 3)
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if len(statePayload) != 3 {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("state malformed, size: %d", len(statePayload)))
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}
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// Use our AEAD construct to enforce secrecy and authenticity:
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// mac: to validate the nonce again, and above timestamp
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// decrypt: to prevent leaking 'redirect_uri' to IdP or logs
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b := []byte(fmt.Sprint(statePayload[0], "|", statePayload[1], "|"))
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redirectString, err := cryptutil.Decrypt(state.cookieCipher, []byte(statePayload[2]), b)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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redirectURL, err := urlutil.ParseAndValidateURL(string(redirectString))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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// verify that the returned timestamp is valid
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if err := cryptutil.ValidTimestamp(statePayload[1]); err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err).WithDescription(fmt.Sprintf(`
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The request expired. This may be because a login attempt took too long, or because the server's clock is out of sync.
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Try again by following this link: [%s](%s).
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Or contact your administrator.
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`, redirectURL.String(), redirectURL.String()))
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}
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idpID := state.flow.GetIdentityProviderIDForURLValues(redirectURL.Query())
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authenticator, err := a.cfg.getIdentityProvider(options, idpID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Successful Authentication Response: rfc6749#section-4.1.2 & OIDC#3.1.2.5
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//
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// Exchange the supplied Authorization Code for a valid user session.
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var claims identity.SessionClaims
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accessToken, err := authenticator.Authenticate(ctx, code, &claims)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error redeeming authenticate code: %w", err)
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}
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s := sessions.NewState(idpID)
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err = claims.Claims.Claims(&s)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error unmarshaling session state: %w", err)
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}
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newState := s.WithNewIssuer(state.redirectURL.Hostname(), []string{state.redirectURL.Hostname()})
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if nextRedirectURL, err := urlutil.ParseAndValidateURL(redirectURL.Query().Get(urlutil.QueryRedirectURI)); err == nil {
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newState.Audience = append(newState.Audience, nextRedirectURL.Hostname())
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}
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// save the session and access token to the databroker/cookie store
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if err := state.flow.PersistSession(ctx, w, &newState, claims, accessToken); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed saving new session: %w", err)
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}
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// ... and the user state to local storage.
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if err := state.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, &newState); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed saving new session: %w", err)
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}
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return redirectURL, nil
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) getSessionFromCtx(ctx context.Context) (*sessions.State, error) {
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state := a.state.Load()
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jwt, err := sessions.FromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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var s sessions.State
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if err := state.sharedEncoder.Unmarshal([]byte(jwt), &s); err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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return &s, nil
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) userInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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ctx, span := trace.StartSpan(r.Context(), "authenticate.userInfo")
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defer span.End()
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options := a.options.Load()
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r = r.WithContext(ctx)
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r = authenticateflow.GetExternalAuthenticateRequest(r, options)
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// if we came in with a redirect URI, save it to a cookie so it doesn't expire with the HMAC
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if redirectURI := r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryRedirectURI); redirectURI != "" {
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u := urlutil.GetAbsoluteURL(r)
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u.RawQuery = ""
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cookie := options.NewCookie()
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cookie.Name = urlutil.QueryRedirectURI
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cookie.Value = redirectURI
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http.SetCookie(w, cookie)
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http.Redirect(w, r, u.String(), http.StatusFound)
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return nil
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}
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handlers.UserInfo(a.getUserInfoData(r)).ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return nil
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) getUserInfoData(r *http.Request) handlers.UserInfoData {
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state := a.state.Load()
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s, err := a.getSessionFromCtx(r.Context())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.ID = uuid.New().String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data := state.flow.GetUserInfoData(r, s)
|
|
data.CSRFToken = csrf.Token(r)
|
|
data.BrandingOptions = a.options.Load().BrandingOptions
|
|
return data
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// revokeSession always clears the local session and tries to revoke the associated session stored in the
|
|
// databroker. If successful, it returns the original `id_token` of the session, if failed, returns
|
|
// and empty string.
|
|
func (a *Authenticate) revokeSession(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) string {
|
|
state := a.state.Load()
|
|
options := a.options.Load()
|
|
|
|
// clear the user's local session no matter what
|
|
defer state.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
|
|
|
|
idpID := r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryIdentityProviderID)
|
|
|
|
authenticator, err := a.cfg.getIdentityProvider(options, idpID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sessionState, _ := a.getSessionFromCtx(ctx)
|
|
|
|
return state.flow.RevokeSession(ctx, r, authenticator, sessionState)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Callback handles the result of a successful call to the authenticate service
|
|
// and is responsible setting per-route sessions.
|
|
func (a *Authenticate) Callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
|
|
redirectURLString := r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryRedirectURI)
|
|
encryptedSession := r.FormValue(urlutil.QuerySessionEncrypted)
|
|
|
|
redirectURL, err := urlutil.ParseAndValidateURL(redirectURLString)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rawJWT, err := a.saveCallbackSession(w, r, encryptedSession)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if programmatic, encode the session jwt as a query param
|
|
if isProgrammatic := r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryIsProgrammatic); isProgrammatic == "true" {
|
|
q := redirectURL.Query()
|
|
q.Set(urlutil.QueryPomeriumJWT, string(rawJWT))
|
|
redirectURL.RawQuery = q.Encode()
|
|
}
|
|
httputil.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL.String(), http.StatusFound)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// saveCallbackSession takes an encrypted per-route session token, decrypts
|
|
// it using the shared service key, then stores it the local session store.
|
|
func (a *Authenticate) saveCallbackSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, enctoken string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
state := a.state.Load()
|
|
|
|
// 1. extract the base64 encoded and encrypted JWT from query params
|
|
encryptedJWT, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(enctoken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("proxy: malfromed callback token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// 2. decrypt the JWT using the cipher using the _shared_ secret key
|
|
rawJWT, err := cryptutil.Decrypt(state.sharedCipher, encryptedJWT, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("proxy: callback token decrypt error: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// 3. Save the decrypted JWT to the session store directly as a string, without resigning
|
|
if err = state.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, rawJWT); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("proxy: callback session save failure: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return rawJWT, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (a *Authenticate) getIdentityProviderIDForRequest(r *http.Request) string {
|
|
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
return a.state.Load().flow.GetIdentityProviderIDForURLValues(r.Form)
|
|
}
|