pomerium/internal/middleware/middleware.go
Bobby DeSimone c886b924e7
authenticate: use gRPC for service endpoints (#39)
* authenticate: set cookie secure as default.
* authenticate: remove single flight provider.
* authenticate/providers: Rename “ProviderData” to “IdentityProvider”
* authenticate/providers: Fixed an issue where scopes were not being overwritten
* proxy/authenticate : http client code removed.
* proxy: standardized session variable names between services.
* docs: change basic docker-config to be an “all-in-one” example with no nginx load.
* docs:  nginx balanced docker compose example with intra-ingress settings.
* license:  attribution for adaptation of goji’s middleware pattern.
2019-02-08 10:10:38 -08:00

203 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

package middleware // import "github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/middleware"
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/httputil"
)
// SetHeaders ensures that every response includes some basic security headers
func SetHeaders(securityHeaders map[string]string) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
for key, val := range securityHeaders {
w.Header().Set(key, val)
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// ValidateClientSecret checks the request header for the client secret and returns
// an error if it does not match the proxy client secret
func ValidateClientSecret(sharedSecret string) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
clientSecret := r.Form.Get("shared_secret")
// check the request header for the client secret
if clientSecret == "" {
clientSecret = r.Header.Get("X-Client-Secret")
}
if clientSecret != sharedSecret {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, "Invalid client secret", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// ValidateRedirectURI checks the redirect uri in the query parameters and ensures that
// the its domain is in the list of proxy root domains.
func ValidateRedirectURI(proxyRootDomains []string) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
redirectURI := r.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
if !ValidRedirectURI(redirectURI, proxyRootDomains) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, "Invalid redirect parameter", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// ValidRedirectURI checks if a URL's domain is one in the list of proxy root domains.
func ValidRedirectURI(uri string, rootDomains []string) bool {
if uri == "" || len(rootDomains) == 0 {
return false
}
redirectURL, err := url.Parse(uri)
if err != nil || redirectURL.Host == "" {
return false
}
for _, domain := range rootDomains {
if domain == "" {
return false
}
if strings.HasSuffix(redirectURL.Hostname(), domain) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// ValidateSignature ensures the request is valid and has been signed with
// the correspdoning client secret key
func ValidateSignature(sharedSecret string) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
redirectURI := r.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
sigVal := r.Form.Get("sig")
timestamp := r.Form.Get("ts")
if !ValidSignature(redirectURI, sigVal, timestamp, sharedSecret) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, "Cross service signature failed to validate", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// ValidateHost ensures that each request's host is valid
func ValidateHost(mux map[string]http.Handler) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if _, ok := mux[r.Host]; !ok {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, "Unknown route", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// RequireHTTPS reroutes a HTTP request to HTTPS
// todo(bdd) : this is unreliable unless behind another reverser proxy
// todo(bdd) : header age seems extreme
func RequireHTTPS(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000")
// todo(bdd) : scheme and x-forwarded-proto cannot be trusted if not behind another load balancer
if (r.URL.Scheme == "http" && r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "http") || &r.TLS == nil {
dest := &url.URL{
Scheme: "https",
Host: r.Host,
Path: r.URL.Path,
RawQuery: r.URL.RawQuery,
}
http.Redirect(w, r, dest.String(), http.StatusMovedPermanently)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// Healthcheck endpoint middleware useful to setting up a path like
// `/ping` that load balancers or uptime testing external services
// can make a request before hitting any routes. It's also convenient
// to place this above ACL middlewares as well.
func Healthcheck(endpoint, msg string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
f := func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "GET" && strings.EqualFold(r.URL.Path, endpoint) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(msg))
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
}
return f
}
// ValidSignature checks to see if a signature is valid. Compares hmac of
// redirect uri, timestamp, and secret and signature.
func ValidSignature(redirectURI, sigVal, timestamp, secret string) bool {
if redirectURI == "" || sigVal == "" || timestamp == "" || secret == "" {
return false
}
_, err := url.Parse(redirectURI)
if err != nil {
return false
}
requestSig, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(sigVal)
if err != nil {
return false
}
i, err := strconv.ParseInt(timestamp, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return false
}
tm := time.Unix(i, 0)
ttl := 5 * time.Minute
if time.Since(tm) > ttl {
return false
}
localSig := redirectURLSignature(redirectURI, tm, secret)
return hmac.Equal(requestSig, localSig)
}
func redirectURLSignature(rawRedirect string, timestamp time.Time, secret string) []byte {
h := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret))
h.Write([]byte(rawRedirect))
h.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprint(timestamp.Unix())))
return h.Sum(nil)
}