mirror of
https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium.git
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443 lines
16 KiB
Go
443 lines
16 KiB
Go
package authenticate
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/rs/cors"
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"github.com/pomerium/csrf"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/cryptutil"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/httputil"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/identity/oidc"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/log"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/middleware"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/sessions"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/telemetry/trace"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/urlutil"
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)
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// Handler returns the authenticate service's handler chain.
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func (a *Authenticate) Handler() http.Handler {
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r := httputil.NewRouter()
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r.Use(middleware.SetHeaders(httputil.HeadersContentSecurityPolicy))
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r.Use(csrf.Protect(
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a.cookieSecret,
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csrf.Secure(a.cookieOptions.Secure),
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csrf.Path("/"),
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csrf.UnsafePaths([]string{a.RedirectURL.Path}), // enforce CSRF on "safe" handler
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csrf.FormValueName("state"), // rfc6749 section-10.12
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csrf.CookieName(fmt.Sprintf("%s_csrf", a.cookieOptions.Name)),
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csrf.ErrorHandler(httputil.HandlerFunc(httputil.CSRFFailureHandler)),
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))
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r.Path("/robots.txt").HandlerFunc(a.RobotsTxt).Methods(http.MethodGet)
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// Identity Provider (IdP) endpoints
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r.Path("/oauth2/callback").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(a.OAuthCallback)).Methods(http.MethodGet)
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// Proxy service endpoints
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v := r.PathPrefix("/.pomerium").Subrouter()
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c := cors.New(cors.Options{
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AllowOriginRequestFunc: func(r *http.Request, _ string) bool {
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err := middleware.ValidateRequestURL(r, a.sharedKey)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Info().Err(err).Msg("authenticate: origin blocked")
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}
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return err == nil
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},
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AllowCredentials: true,
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AllowedHeaders: []string{"*"},
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})
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v.Use(c.Handler)
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v.Use(middleware.ValidateSignature(a.sharedKey))
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v.Use(sessions.RetrieveSession(a.sessionLoaders...))
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v.Use(a.VerifySession)
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v.Path("/sign_in").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(a.SignIn))
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v.Path("/sign_out").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(a.SignOut))
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v.Path("/refresh").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(a.Refresh)).Methods(http.MethodGet)
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// programmatic access api endpoint
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api := r.PathPrefix("/api").Subrouter()
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api.Use(sessions.RetrieveSession(a.sessionLoaders...))
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api.Path("/v1/refresh").Handler(httputil.HandlerFunc(a.RefreshAPI))
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return r
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}
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// VerifySession is the middleware used to enforce a valid authentication
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// session state is attached to the users's request context.
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func (a *Authenticate) VerifySession(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return httputil.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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ctx := r.Context()
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jwt, err := sessions.FromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Info().Err(err).Msg("authenticate: session load error")
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return a.reauthenticateOrFail(w, r, err)
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}
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var s sessions.State
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if err := a.encryptedEncoder.Unmarshal([]byte(jwt), &s); err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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if err := s.Verify(r.Host); errors.Is(err, sessions.ErrExpired) {
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ctx, err = a.refresh(w, r, &s)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Info().Err(err).Msg("authenticate: verify session, refresh")
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return a.reauthenticateOrFail(w, r, err)
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}
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} else if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Info().Err(err).Msg("authenticate: verify session")
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return a.reauthenticateOrFail(w, r, err)
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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return nil
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})
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) refresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, s *sessions.State) (context.Context, error) {
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ctx, span := trace.StartSpan(r.Context(), "authenticate.VerifySession/refresh")
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defer span.End()
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newSession, err := a.provider.Refresh(ctx, s)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authenticate: refresh failed: %w", err)
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}
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if err := a.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, newSession); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authenticate: refresh save failed: %w", err)
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}
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newSession = newSession.NewSession(s.Issuer, s.Audience)
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encSession, err := a.encryptedEncoder.Marshal(newSession)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// return the new session and add it to the current request context
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return sessions.NewContext(ctx, string(encSession), err), nil
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}
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// RobotsTxt handles the /robots.txt route.
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func (a *Authenticate) RobotsTxt(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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fmt.Fprintf(w, "User-agent: *\nDisallow: /")
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}
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// SignIn handles to authenticating a user.
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func (a *Authenticate) SignIn(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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redirectURL, err := urlutil.ParseAndValidateURL(r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryRedirectURI))
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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jwtAudience := []string{a.RedirectURL.Host, redirectURL.Host}
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var callbackURL *url.URL
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// if the callback is explicitly set, set it and add an additional audience
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if callbackStr := r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryCallbackURI); callbackStr != "" {
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callbackURL, err = urlutil.ParseAndValidateURL(callbackStr)
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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jwtAudience = append(jwtAudience, callbackURL.Host)
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} else {
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// otherwise, assume callback is the same host as redirect
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callbackURL, _ = urlutil.DeepCopy(redirectURL)
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callbackURL.Path = "/.pomerium/callback/"
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callbackURL.RawQuery = ""
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}
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// add an additional claim for the forward-auth host, if set
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if fwdAuth := r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryForwardAuth); fwdAuth != "" {
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jwtAudience = append(jwtAudience, fwdAuth)
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}
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jwt, err := sessions.FromContext(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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var s sessions.State
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if err := a.encryptedEncoder.Unmarshal([]byte(jwt), &s); err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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if err := s.Verify(r.Host); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, sessions.ErrExpired) {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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// user impersonation
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if impersonate := r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryImpersonateAction); impersonate != "" {
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s.SetImpersonation(r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryImpersonateEmail), r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryImpersonateGroups))
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}
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// re-persist the session, useful when session was evicted from session
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if err := a.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, &s); err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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newSession := s.NewSession(a.RedirectURL.Host, jwtAudience)
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callbackParams := callbackURL.Query()
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if r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryIsProgrammatic) == "true" {
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newSession.Programmatic = true
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encSession, err := a.encryptedEncoder.Marshal(newSession)
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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callbackParams.Set(urlutil.QueryRefreshToken, string(encSession))
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callbackParams.Set(urlutil.QueryIsProgrammatic, "true")
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}
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// sign the route session, as a JWT
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signedJWT, err := a.sharedEncoder.Marshal(newSession.RouteSession())
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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// encrypt our route-based token JWT avoiding any accidental logging
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encryptedJWT := cryptutil.Encrypt(a.sharedCipher, signedJWT, nil)
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// base64 our encrypted payload for URL-friendlyness
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encodedJWT := base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(encryptedJWT)
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// add our encoded and encrypted route-session JWT to a query param
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callbackParams.Set(urlutil.QuerySessionEncrypted, encodedJWT)
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callbackParams.Set(urlutil.QueryRedirectURI, redirectURL.String())
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callbackURL.RawQuery = callbackParams.Encode()
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// build our hmac-d redirect URL with our session, pointing back to the
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// proxy's callback URL which is responsible for setting our new route-session
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uri := urlutil.NewSignedURL(a.sharedKey, callbackURL)
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httputil.Redirect(w, r, uri.String(), http.StatusFound)
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return nil
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}
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// SignOut signs the user out and attempts to revoke the user's identity session
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// Handles both GET and POST.
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func (a *Authenticate) SignOut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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// no matter what happens, we want to clear the local session store
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defer a.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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jwt, err := sessions.FromContext(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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var s sessions.State
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if err := a.encryptedEncoder.Unmarshal([]byte(jwt), &s); err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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redirectString := r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryRedirectURI)
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// first, try to revoke the session if implemented
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err = a.provider.Revoke(r.Context(), s.AccessToken)
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if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, oidc.ErrRevokeNotImplemented) {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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// next, try to build a logout url if implemented
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endSessionURL, err := a.provider.LogOut()
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if err == nil {
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params := url.Values{}
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params.Add("post_logout_redirect_uri", redirectString)
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endSessionURL.RawQuery = params.Encode()
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redirectString = endSessionURL.String()
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} else if !errors.Is(err, oidc.ErrSignoutNotImplemented) {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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redirectURL, err := urlutil.ParseAndValidateURL(redirectString)
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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httputil.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL.String(), http.StatusFound)
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return nil
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}
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// reauthenticateOrFail starts the authenticate process by redirecting the
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// user to their respective identity provider. This function also builds the
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// 'state' parameter which is encrypted and includes authenticating data
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// for validation.
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// If the request is a `xhr/ajax` request (e.g the `X-Requested-With` header)
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// is set do not redirect but instead return 401 unauthorized.
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//
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// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0-final.html#AuthRequest
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.2.1
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// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/XMLHttpRequest
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func (a *Authenticate) reauthenticateOrFail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) error {
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// If request AJAX/XHR request, return a 401 instead .
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if reqType := r.Header.Get("X-Requested-With"); strings.EqualFold(reqType, "XmlHttpRequest") {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusUnauthorized, err)
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}
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a.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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redirectURL := a.RedirectURL.ResolveReference(r.URL)
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nonce := csrf.Token(r)
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now := time.Now().Unix()
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b := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s|%d|", nonce, now))
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enc := cryptutil.Encrypt(a.cookieCipher, []byte(redirectURL.String()), b)
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b = append(b, enc...)
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encodedState := base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
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httputil.Redirect(w, r, a.provider.GetSignInURL(encodedState), http.StatusFound)
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return nil
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}
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// OAuthCallback handles the callback from the identity provider.
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//
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// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#CodeFlowSteps
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// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#AuthResponse
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func (a *Authenticate) OAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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redirect, err := a.getOAuthCallback(w, r)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("oauth callback : %w", err)
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}
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httputil.Redirect(w, r, redirect.String(), http.StatusFound)
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return nil
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) statusForErrorCode(errorCode string) int {
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switch errorCode {
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case "access_denied", "unauthorized_client":
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return http.StatusUnauthorized
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default:
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return http.StatusBadRequest
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}
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}
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func (a *Authenticate) getOAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {
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// Error Authentication Response: rfc6749#section-4.1.2.1 & OIDC#3.1.2.6
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//
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// first, check if the identity provider returned an error
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if idpError := r.FormValue("error"); idpError != "" {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(a.statusForErrorCode(idpError), fmt.Errorf("identity provider: %v", idpError))
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}
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// fail if no session redemption code is returned
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code := r.FormValue("code")
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if code == "" {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("identity provider returned empty code"))
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}
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// Successful Authentication Response: rfc6749#section-4.1.2 & OIDC#3.1.2.5
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//
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// Exchange the supplied Authorization Code for a valid user session.
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session, err := a.provider.Authenticate(r.Context(), code)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error redeeming authenticate code: %w", err)
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}
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// state includes a csrf nonce (validated by middleware) and redirect uri
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bytes, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(r.FormValue("state"))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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// split state into concat'd components
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// (nonce|timestamp|redirect_url|encrypted_data(redirect_url)+mac(nonce,ts))
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statePayload := strings.SplitN(string(bytes), "|", 3)
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if len(statePayload) != 3 {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("state malformed, size: %d", len(statePayload)))
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}
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// verify that the returned timestamp is valid
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if err := cryptutil.ValidTimestamp(statePayload[1]); err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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// Use our AEAD construct to enforce secrecy and authenticity:
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// mac: to validate the nonce again, and above timestamp
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// decrypt: to prevent leaking 'redirect_uri' to IdP or logs
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b := []byte(fmt.Sprint(statePayload[0], "|", statePayload[1], "|"))
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redirectString, err := cryptutil.Decrypt(a.cookieCipher, []byte(statePayload[2]), b)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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redirectURL, err := urlutil.ParseAndValidateURL(string(redirectString))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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// OK. Looks good so let's persist our user session
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if err := a.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, session); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed saving new session: %w", err)
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}
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return redirectURL, nil
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}
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// RefreshAPI loads a global state, and attempts to refresh the session's access
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// tokens and state with the identity provider. If successful, a new signed JWT
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// and refresh token (`refresh_token`) are returned as JSON
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func (a *Authenticate) RefreshAPI(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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jwt, err := sessions.FromContext(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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var s sessions.State
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if err := a.encryptedEncoder.Unmarshal([]byte(jwt), &s); err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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err = s.Verify(r.Host)
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if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, sessions.ErrExpired) {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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newSession, err := a.provider.Refresh(r.Context(), &s)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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newSession = newSession.NewSession(s.Issuer, s.Audience)
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encSession, err := a.encryptedEncoder.Marshal(newSession)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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signedJWT, err := a.sharedEncoder.Marshal(newSession.RouteSession())
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var response struct {
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JWT string `json:"jwt"`
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RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
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}
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response.RefreshToken = string(encSession)
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response.JWT = string(signedJWT)
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jsonResponse, err := json.Marshal(&response)
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.Write(jsonResponse)
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return nil
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}
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// Refresh is called by the proxy service to handle backend session refresh.
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//
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// NOTE: The actual refresh is handled as part of the "VerifySession"
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// middleware. This handler is responsible for creating a new route scoped
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// session and returning it.
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func (a *Authenticate) Refresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
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jwt, err := sessions.FromContext(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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var s sessions.State
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if err := a.encryptedEncoder.Unmarshal([]byte(jwt), &s); err != nil {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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if err := s.Verify(r.Host); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, sessions.ErrExpired) {
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return httputil.NewError(http.StatusBadRequest, err)
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}
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aud := strings.Split(r.FormValue(urlutil.QueryAudience), ",")
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routeSession := s.NewSession(r.Host, aud)
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routeSession.AccessTokenID = s.AccessTokenID
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signedJWT, err := a.sharedEncoder.Marshal(routeSession.RouteSession())
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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|
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/jwt") // RFC 7519 : 10.3.1
|
|
w.Write(signedJWT)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|