mirror of
https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium.git
synced 2025-04-29 10:26:29 +02:00
543 lines
20 KiB
Go
543 lines
20 KiB
Go
package proxy // import "github.com/pomerium/pomerium/proxy"
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import (
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/config"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/cryptutil"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/httputil"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/log"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/middleware"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/sessions"
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"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/templates"
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)
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// StateParameter holds the redirect id along with the session id.
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type StateParameter struct {
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SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
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RedirectURI string `json:"redirect_uri"`
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}
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// Handler returns the proxy service's ServeMux
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func (p *Proxy) Handler() http.Handler {
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// validation middleware chain
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validate := middleware.NewChain()
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validate = validate.Append(middleware.ValidateHost(func(host string) bool {
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_, ok := p.routeConfigs[host]
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return ok
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}))
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("/robots.txt", p.RobotsTxt)
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mux.HandleFunc("/.pomerium", p.UserDashboard)
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mux.HandleFunc("/.pomerium/impersonate", p.Impersonate) // POST
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mux.HandleFunc("/.pomerium/sign_out", p.SignOut)
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// handlers handlers with validation
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mux.Handle("/.pomerium/callback", validate.ThenFunc(p.OAuthCallback))
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mux.Handle("/.pomerium/refresh", validate.ThenFunc(p.Refresh))
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mux.Handle("/", validate.ThenFunc(p.Proxy))
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return mux
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}
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// RobotsTxt sets the User-Agent header in the response to be "Disallow"
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func (p *Proxy) RobotsTxt(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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fmt.Fprintf(w, "User-agent: *\nDisallow: /")
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}
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// SignOut redirects the request to the sign out url. It's the responsibility
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// of the authenticate service to revoke the remote session and clear
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// the local session state.
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func (p *Proxy) SignOut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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redirectURL := &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: r.Host, Path: "/"}
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switch r.Method {
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case http.MethodPost:
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if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, &httputil.Error{Code: http.StatusBadRequest})
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return
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}
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uri, err := url.Parse(r.Form.Get("redirect_uri"))
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if err == nil && uri.String() != "" {
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redirectURL = uri
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}
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default:
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uri, err := url.Parse(r.URL.Query().Get("redirect_uri"))
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if err == nil && uri.String() != "" {
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redirectURL = uri
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}
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}
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http.Redirect(w, r, p.GetSignOutURL(p.AuthenticateURL, redirectURL).String(), http.StatusFound)
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}
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// OAuthStart begins the authenticate flow, encrypting the redirect url
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// in a request to the provider's sign in endpoint.
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func (p *Proxy) OAuthStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// create a CSRF value used to mitigate replay attacks.
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state := &StateParameter{
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SessionID: fmt.Sprintf("%x", cryptutil.GenerateKey()),
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RedirectURI: r.URL.String(),
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}
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// Encrypt, and save CSRF state. Will be checked on callback.
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localState, err := p.cipher.Marshal(state)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: failed to marshal csrf")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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p.csrfStore.SetCSRF(w, r, localState)
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// Though the plaintext payload is identical, we re-encrypt which will
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// create a different cipher text using another nonce
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remoteState, err := p.cipher.Marshal(state)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: failed to encrypt cookie")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// Sanity check. The encrypted payload of local and remote state should
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// never match as each encryption round uses a cryptographic nonce.
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//
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// todo(bdd): since this should nearly (1/(2^32*2^32)) never happen should
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// we panic as a failure most likely means the rands entropy source is failing?
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if remoteState == localState {
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p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Msg("proxy: encrypted state should not match")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), Code: http.StatusBadRequest}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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signinURL := p.GetSignInURL(p.AuthenticateURL, p.GetRedirectURL(r.Host), remoteState)
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log.FromRequest(r).Debug().Str("SigninURL", signinURL.String()).Msg("proxy: oauth start")
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// Redirect the user to the authenticate service along with the encrypted
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// state which contains a redirect uri back to the proxy and a nonce
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http.Redirect(w, r, signinURL.String(), http.StatusFound)
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}
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// OAuthCallback validates the cookie sent back from the authenticate service. This function will
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// contain an error, or it will contain a `code`; the code can be used to fetch an access token, and
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// other metadata, from the authenticator.
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// finish the oauth cycle
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func (p *Proxy) OAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: failed parsing request form")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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if errorString := r.Form.Get("error"); errorString != "" {
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: errorString, Code: http.StatusBadRequest}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// Encrypted CSRF passed from authenticate service
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remoteStateEncrypted := r.Form.Get("state")
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remoteStatePlain := new(StateParameter)
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if err := p.cipher.Unmarshal(remoteStateEncrypted, remoteStatePlain); err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: could not unmarshal state")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: "Internal error", Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// Encrypted CSRF from session storage
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c, err := p.csrfStore.GetCSRF(r)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: failed parsing csrf cookie")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusBadRequest}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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p.csrfStore.ClearCSRF(w, r)
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localStateEncrypted := c.Value
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localStatePlain := new(StateParameter)
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err = p.cipher.Unmarshal(localStateEncrypted, localStatePlain)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: couldn't unmarshal CSRF")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: "Internal error", Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// If the encrypted value of local and remote state match, reject.
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// Likely a replay attack or nonce-reuse.
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if remoteStateEncrypted == localStateEncrypted {
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p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Msg("proxy: local and remote state should not match")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), Code: http.StatusBadRequest}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// Decrypted remote and local state struct (inc. nonce) must match
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if remoteStatePlain.SessionID != localStatePlain.SessionID {
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p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Msg("proxy: CSRF mismatch")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: "CSRF mismatch", Code: http.StatusBadRequest}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// This is the redirect back to the original requested application
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http.Redirect(w, r, remoteStatePlain.RedirectURI, http.StatusFound)
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}
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// shouldSkipAuthentication contains conditions for skipping authentication.
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// Conditions should be few in number and have strong justifications.
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func (p *Proxy) shouldSkipAuthentication(r *http.Request) bool {
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policy, policyExists := p.policy(r)
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if isCORSPreflight(r) && policyExists && policy.CORSAllowPreflight {
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log.FromRequest(r).Debug().Msg("proxy: skipping authentication for valid CORS preflight request")
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return true
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}
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if policyExists && policy.AllowPublicUnauthenticatedAccess {
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log.FromRequest(r).Debug().Msg("proxy: skipping authentication for public route")
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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// isCORSPreflight inspects the request to see if this is a valid CORS preflight request.
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// These checks are not exhaustive, because the proxied server should be verifying it as well.
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//
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// See https://www.html5rocks.com/static/images/cors_server_flowchart.png for more info.
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func isCORSPreflight(r *http.Request) bool {
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return r.Method == http.MethodOptions &&
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r.Header.Get("Access-Control-Request-Method") != "" &&
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r.Header.Get("Origin") != ""
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}
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// Proxy authenticates a request, either proxying the request if it is authenticated,
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// or starting the authenticate service for validation if not.
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func (p *Proxy) Proxy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !p.shouldSkipAuthentication(r) {
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s, err := p.restStore.LoadSession(r)
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// if authorization bearer token does not exist or fails, use cookie store
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if err != nil || s == nil {
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s, err = p.sessionStore.LoadSession(r)
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if err != nil {
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switch err {
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case http.ErrNoCookie, sessions.ErrLifetimeExpired, sessions.ErrInvalidSession:
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log.FromRequest(r).Debug().Str("cause", err.Error()).Msg("proxy: invalid session, start auth process")
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p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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p.OAuthStart(w, r)
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return
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default:
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: unexpected error")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: "An unexpected error occurred", Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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}
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}
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if err = p.authenticate(w, r, s); err != nil {
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p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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log.FromRequest(r).Debug().Err(err).Msg("proxy: user unauthenticated")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: "User unauthenticated", Code: http.StatusForbidden, CanDebug: true}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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authorized, err := p.AuthorizeClient.Authorize(r.Context(), r.Host, s)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: failed authorization")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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if !authorized {
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log.FromRequest(r).Warn().Err(err).Msg("proxy: user unauthorized")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Code: http.StatusUnauthorized, CanDebug: true}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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r.Header.Set(HeaderUserID, s.User)
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r.Header.Set(HeaderEmail, s.RequestEmail())
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r.Header.Set(HeaderGroups, s.RequestGroups())
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}
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// We have validated the users request and now proxy their request to the provided upstream.
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route, ok := p.router(r)
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if !ok {
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, &httputil.Error{Code: http.StatusNotFound})
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return
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}
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route.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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}
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// UserDashboard lets users investigate, and refresh their current session.
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// It also contains certain administrative actions like user impersonation.
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// Nota bene: This endpoint does authentication, not authorization.
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func (p *Proxy) UserDashboard(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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session, err := p.sessionStore.LoadSession(r)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Debug().Str("cause", err.Error()).Msg("proxy: no session, redirecting to auth")
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p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
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p.OAuthStart(w, r)
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return
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}
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if err := p.authenticate(w, r, session); err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: authenticate failed")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Code: http.StatusUnauthorized, CanDebug: true}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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redirectURL := &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: r.Host, Path: "/.pomerium/sign_out"}
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isAdmin, err := p.AuthorizeClient.IsAdmin(r.Context(), session)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: is admin client")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// CSRF value used to mitigate replay attacks.
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csrf := &StateParameter{SessionID: fmt.Sprintf("%x", cryptutil.GenerateKey())}
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csrfCookie, err := p.cipher.Marshal(csrf)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: failed to marshal csrf")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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p.csrfStore.SetCSRF(w, r, csrfCookie)
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t := struct {
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Email string
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User string
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Groups []string
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RefreshDeadline string
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SignoutURL string
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IsAdmin bool
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ImpersonateEmail string
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ImpersonateGroup string
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CSRF string
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}{
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Email: session.Email,
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User: session.User,
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Groups: session.Groups,
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RefreshDeadline: time.Until(session.RefreshDeadline).Round(time.Second).String(),
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SignoutURL: p.GetSignOutURL(p.AuthenticateURL, redirectURL).String(),
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IsAdmin: isAdmin,
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ImpersonateEmail: session.ImpersonateEmail,
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ImpersonateGroup: strings.Join(session.ImpersonateGroups, ","),
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CSRF: csrf.SessionID,
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}
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templates.New().ExecuteTemplate(w, "dashboard.html", t)
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}
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// Refresh redeems and extends an existing authenticated oidc session with
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// the underlying identity provider. All session details including groups,
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// timeouts, will be renewed.
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func (p *Proxy) Refresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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session, err := p.sessionStore.LoadSession(r)
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if err != nil {
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusBadRequest}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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iss, err := session.IssuedAt()
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: couldn't get token's create time")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// reject a refresh if it's been less than the refresh cooldown to prevent abuse
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if time.Since(iss) < p.refreshCooldown {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Dur("cooldown", p.refreshCooldown).Err(err).Msg("proxy: refresh cooldown")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{
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Message: fmt.Sprintf("Session must be %v old before refresh", p.refreshCooldown),
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Code: http.StatusBadRequest}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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newSession, err := p.AuthenticateClient.Refresh(r.Context(), session)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Warn().Err(err).Msg("proxy: refresh failed")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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if err = p.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, newSession); err != nil {
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/.pomerium", http.StatusFound)
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}
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// Impersonate takes the result of a form and adds user impersonation details
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// to the user's current user sessions state if the user is currently an
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// administrative user. Requests are redirected back to the user dashboard.
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func (p *Proxy) Impersonate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
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if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: impersonate form")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusBadRequest}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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session, err := p.sessionStore.LoadSession(r)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: load session")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// authorization check -- is this user an admin?
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isAdmin, err := p.AuthorizeClient.IsAdmin(r.Context(), session)
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if err != nil || !isAdmin {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: user must be admin to impersonate")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{
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Message: fmt.Sprintf("%s must be and administrator", session.Email),
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Code: http.StatusForbidden,
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CanDebug: true}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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// CSRF check -- did this request originate from our form?
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c, err := p.csrfStore.GetCSRF(r)
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if err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: failed parsing csrf cookie")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusBadRequest}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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p.csrfStore.ClearCSRF(w, r)
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encryptedCSRF := c.Value
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decryptedCSRF := new(StateParameter)
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if err = p.cipher.Unmarshal(encryptedCSRF, decryptedCSRF); err != nil {
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log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: couldn't unmarshal CSRF")
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httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: "Internal error", Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
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httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
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return
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}
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if decryptedCSRF.SessionID != r.FormValue("csrf") {
|
|
log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: impersonate CSRF mismatch")
|
|
httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: "CSRF mismatch", Code: http.StatusForbidden}
|
|
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// OK to impersonation
|
|
session.ImpersonateEmail = r.FormValue("email")
|
|
session.ImpersonateGroups = strings.Split(r.FormValue("group"), ",")
|
|
|
|
if err := p.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, session); err != nil {
|
|
log.FromRequest(r).Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy: save session")
|
|
httpErr := &httputil.Error{Message: err.Error(), Code: http.StatusInternalServerError}
|
|
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httpErr)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
http.Redirect(w, r, "/.pomerium", http.StatusFound)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Authenticate authenticates a request by checking for a session cookie, and validating its expiration,
|
|
// clearing the session cookie if it's invalid and returning an error if necessary..
|
|
func (p *Proxy) authenticate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, s *sessions.SessionState) error {
|
|
if s.RefreshPeriodExpired() {
|
|
s, err := p.AuthenticateClient.Refresh(r.Context(), s)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("proxy: session refresh failed : %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := p.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, s); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("proxy: refresh failed : %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
valid, err := p.AuthenticateClient.Validate(r.Context(), s.IDToken)
|
|
if err != nil || !valid {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("proxy: session validate failed: %v : %v", valid, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// router attempts to find a route for a request. If a route is successfully matched,
|
|
// it returns the route information and a bool value of `true`. If a route can
|
|
// not be matched, a nil value for the route and false bool value is returned.
|
|
func (p *Proxy) router(r *http.Request) (http.Handler, bool) {
|
|
config, ok := p.routeConfigs[r.Host]
|
|
if ok {
|
|
return config.mux, true
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// policy attempts to find a policy for a request. If a policy is successfully matched,
|
|
// it returns the policy information and a bool value of `true`. If a policy can not be matched,
|
|
// a nil value for the policy and false bool value is returned.
|
|
func (p *Proxy) policy(r *http.Request) (*config.Policy, bool) {
|
|
config, ok := p.routeConfigs[r.Host]
|
|
if ok {
|
|
return &config.policy, true
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetRedirectURL returns the redirect url for a single reverse proxy host. HTTPS is set explicitly.
|
|
func (p *Proxy) GetRedirectURL(host string) *url.URL {
|
|
u := p.redirectURL
|
|
u.Scheme = "https"
|
|
u.Host = host
|
|
return u
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// signRedirectURL takes a redirect url string and timestamp and returns the base64
|
|
// encoded HMAC result.
|
|
func (p *Proxy) signRedirectURL(rawRedirect string, timestamp time.Time) string {
|
|
data := []byte(fmt.Sprint(rawRedirect, timestamp.Unix()))
|
|
h := cryptutil.Hash(p.SharedKey, data)
|
|
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(h)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetSignInURL with typical oauth parameters
|
|
func (p *Proxy) GetSignInURL(authenticateURL, redirectURL *url.URL, state string) *url.URL {
|
|
a := authenticateURL.ResolveReference(&url.URL{Path: "/sign_in"})
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
rawRedirect := redirectURL.String()
|
|
params, _ := url.ParseQuery(a.RawQuery)
|
|
params.Set("redirect_uri", rawRedirect)
|
|
params.Set("shared_secret", p.SharedKey)
|
|
params.Set("response_type", "code")
|
|
params.Add("state", state)
|
|
params.Set("ts", fmt.Sprint(now.Unix()))
|
|
params.Set("sig", p.signRedirectURL(rawRedirect, now))
|
|
a.RawQuery = params.Encode()
|
|
return a
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetSignOutURL creates and returns the sign out URL, given a redirectURL
|
|
func (p *Proxy) GetSignOutURL(authenticateURL, redirectURL *url.URL) *url.URL {
|
|
a := authenticateURL.ResolveReference(&url.URL{Path: "/sign_out"})
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
rawRedirect := redirectURL.String()
|
|
params, _ := url.ParseQuery(a.RawQuery)
|
|
params.Add("redirect_uri", rawRedirect)
|
|
params.Set("ts", fmt.Sprint(now.Unix()))
|
|
params.Set("sig", p.signRedirectURL(rawRedirect, now))
|
|
a.RawQuery = params.Encode()
|
|
return a
|
|
}
|