pomerium/proxy/handlers.go
Bobby DeSimone 24b11b0428
internal/cryputil: combines aead and cryptutil packages.
- Refactored encrypt / decrypt methods to use aead's NonceSize() interface method.
- Add explicit GenerateKey function.
- Remove mutex on XChaCha20.
2019-01-18 11:55:04 -08:00

502 lines
17 KiB
Go

package proxy // import "github.com/pomerium/pomerium/proxy"
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"reflect"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/cryptutil"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/httputil"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/log"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/middleware"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/sessions"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/version"
)
const loggingUserHeader = "SSO-Authenticated-User"
var (
//ErrUserNotAuthorized is set when user is not authorized to access a resource
ErrUserNotAuthorized = errors.New("user not authorized")
)
var securityHeaders = map[string]string{
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
"X-Frame-Options": "SAMEORIGIN",
"X-XSS-Protection": "1; mode=block",
}
// Handler returns a http handler for an Proxy
func (p *Proxy) Handler() http.Handler {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/favicon.ico", p.Favicon)
mux.HandleFunc("/robots.txt", p.RobotsTxt)
mux.HandleFunc("/.pomerium/sign_out", p.SignOut)
mux.HandleFunc("/.pomerium/callback", p.OAuthCallback)
mux.HandleFunc("/.pomerium/auth", p.AuthenticateOnly)
mux.HandleFunc("/", p.Proxy)
// Global middleware, which will be applied to each request in reverse
// order as applied here (i.e., we want to validate the host _first_ when
// processing a request)
var handler http.Handler = mux
// todo(bdd) : investigate if setting non-overridable headers makes sense
// handler = p.setResponseHeaderOverrides(handler)
handler = middleware.SetHeaders(handler, securityHeaders)
handler = middleware.ValidateHost(handler, p.mux)
handler = middleware.RequireHTTPS(handler)
handler = log.NewLoggingHandler(handler)
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
// Skip host validation for /ping requests because they hit the LB directly.
if req.URL.Path == "/ping" {
p.PingPage(rw, req)
return
}
handler.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
})
}
// RobotsTxt sets the User-Agent header in the response to be "Disallow"
func (p *Proxy) RobotsTxt(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(rw, "User-agent: *\nDisallow: /")
}
// Favicon will proxy the request as usual if the user is already authenticated
// but responds with a 404 otherwise, to avoid spurious and confusing
// authentication attempts when a browser automatically requests the favicon on
// an error page.
func (p *Proxy) Favicon(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
err := p.Authenticate(rw, req)
if err != nil {
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
p.Proxy(rw, req)
}
// PingPage send back a 200 OK response.
func (p *Proxy) PingPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
fmt.Fprintf(rw, "OK")
}
// SignOut redirects the request to the sign out url.
func (p *Proxy) SignOut(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
p.sessionStore.ClearSession(rw, req)
redirectURL := &url.URL{
Scheme: "https",
Host: req.Host,
Path: "/",
}
fullURL := p.authenticateClient.GetSignOutURL(redirectURL)
http.Redirect(rw, req, fullURL.String(), http.StatusFound)
}
// XHRError returns a simple error response with an error message to the application if the request is an XML request
func (p *Proxy) XHRError(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int, err error) {
jsonError := struct {
Error error `json:"error"`
}{
Error: err,
}
jsonBytes, err := json.Marshal(jsonError)
if err != nil {
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
requestLog := log.WithRequest(req, "proxy.ErrorPage")
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Int("http-status", code).Msg("proxy.XHRError")
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rw.WriteHeader(code)
rw.Write(jsonBytes)
}
// ErrorPage renders an error page with a given status code, title, and message.
func (p *Proxy) ErrorPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, code int, title string, message string) {
if p.isXHR(req) {
p.XHRError(rw, req, code, errors.New(message))
return
}
requestLog := log.WithRequest(req, "proxy.ErrorPage")
requestLog.Info().
Str("page-title", title).
Str("page-message", message).
Msg("proxy.ErrorPage")
rw.WriteHeader(code)
t := struct {
Code int
Title string
Message string
Version string
}{
Code: code,
Title: title,
Message: message,
Version: version.FullVersion(),
}
p.templates.ExecuteTemplate(rw, "error.html", t)
}
func (p *Proxy) isXHR(req *http.Request) bool {
return req.Header.Get("X-Requested-With") == "XMLHttpRequest"
}
// OAuthStart begins the authentication flow, encrypting the redirect url
// in a request to the provider's sign in endpoint.
func (p *Proxy) OAuthStart(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
// The proxy redirects to the authenticator, and provides it with redirectURI (which points
// back to the sso proxy).
requestLog := log.WithRequest(req, "proxy.OAuthStart")
if p.isXHR(req) {
e := errors.New("cannot continue oauth flow on xhr")
requestLog.Error().Err(e).Msg("isXHR")
p.XHRError(rw, req, http.StatusUnauthorized, e)
return
}
requestURI := req.URL.String()
callbackURL := p.GetRedirectURL(req.Host)
// generate nonce
key := cryptutil.GenerateKey()
// state prevents cross site forgery and maintain state across the client and server
state := &StateParameter{
SessionID: fmt.Sprintf("%x", key), // nonce
RedirectURI: requestURI, // where to redirect the user back to
}
// we encrypt this value to be opaque the browser cookie
// this value will be unique since we always use a randomized nonce as part of marshaling
encryptedCSRF, err := p.cipher.Marshal(state)
if err != nil {
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Msg("failed to marshal csrf")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
p.csrfStore.SetCSRF(rw, req, encryptedCSRF)
// we encrypt this value to be opaque the uri query value
// this value will be unique since we always use a randomized nonce as part of marshaling
encryptedState, err := p.cipher.Marshal(state)
if err != nil {
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Msg("failed to encrypt cookie")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
signinURL := p.authenticateClient.GetSignInURL(callbackURL, encryptedState)
requestLog.Info().Msg("redirecting to begin auth flow")
http.Redirect(rw, req, signinURL.String(), http.StatusFound)
}
// OAuthCallback validates the cookie sent back from the provider, then validates
// the user information, and if authorized, redirects the user back to the original
// application.
func (p *Proxy) OAuthCallback(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
// We receive the callback from the SSO Authenticator. This request will either contain an
// error, or it will contain a `code`; the code can be used to fetch an access token, and
// other metadata, from the authenticator.
requestLog := log.WithRequest(req, "proxy.OAuthCallback")
// finish the oauth cycle
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Msg("failed parsing request form")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error", err.Error())
return
}
errorString := req.Form.Get("error")
if errorString != "" {
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "Permission Denied", errorString)
return
}
// We begin the process of redeeming the code for an access token.
session, err := p.redeemCode(req.Host, req.Form.Get("code"))
if err != nil {
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Msg("error redeeming authorization code")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error", "Internal Error")
return
}
encryptedState := req.Form.Get("state")
stateParameter := &StateParameter{}
err = p.cipher.Unmarshal(encryptedState, stateParameter)
if err != nil {
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Msg("could not unmarshal state")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error", "Internal Error")
return
}
c, err := p.csrfStore.GetCSRF(req)
if err != nil {
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Msg("failed parsing csrf cookie")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusBadRequest, "Bad Request", err.Error())
return
}
p.csrfStore.ClearCSRF(rw, req)
encryptedCSRF := c.Value
csrfParameter := &StateParameter{}
err = p.cipher.Unmarshal(encryptedCSRF, csrfParameter)
if err != nil {
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Msg("couldn't unmarshal CSRF")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error", "Internal Error")
return
}
if encryptedState == encryptedCSRF {
requestLog.Error().Msg("encrypted state and CSRF should not be equal")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusBadRequest, "Bad Request", "Bad Request")
return
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(stateParameter, csrfParameter) {
requestLog.Error().Msg("state and CSRF should be equal")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusBadRequest, "Bad Request", "Bad Request")
return
}
// We store the session in a cookie and redirect the user back to the application
err = p.sessionStore.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
if err != nil {
requestLog.Error().Msg("error saving session")
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error", "Internal Error")
return
}
// This is the redirect back to the original requested application
http.Redirect(rw, req, stateParameter.RedirectURI, http.StatusFound)
}
// AuthenticateOnly calls the Authenticate handler.
func (p *Proxy) AuthenticateOnly(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
err := p.Authenticate(rw, req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(rw, "unauthorized request", http.StatusUnauthorized)
}
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
}
// Proxy authenticates a request, either proxying the request if it is authenticated, or starting the authentication process if not.
func (p *Proxy) Proxy(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
// Attempts to validate the user and their cookie.
// start := time.Now()
var err error
err = p.Authenticate(rw, req)
// If the authentication is not successful we proceed to start the OAuth Flow with
// OAuthStart. If authentication is successful, we proceed to proxy to the configured
// upstream.
requestLog := log.WithRequest(req, "proxy.Proxy")
if err != nil {
switch err {
case http.ErrNoCookie:
// No cookie is set, start the oauth flow
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
return
case ErrUserNotAuthorized:
// We know the user is not authorized for the request, we show them a forbidden page
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusForbidden, "Forbidden", "You're not authorized to view this page")
return
case sessions.ErrLifetimeExpired:
// User's lifetime expired, we trigger the start of the oauth flow
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
return
case sessions.ErrInvalidSession:
// The user session is invalid and we can't decode it.
// This can happen for a variety of reasons but the most common non-malicious
// case occurs when the session encoding schema changes. We manage this ux
// by triggering the start of the oauth flow.
p.OAuthStart(rw, req)
return
default:
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Msg("unknown error")
// We don't know exactly what happened, but authenticating the user failed, show an error
p.ErrorPage(rw, req, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal Error", "An unexpected error occurred")
return
}
}
// We have validated the users request and now proxy their request to the provided upstream.
route, ok := p.router(req)
if !ok {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, "Unknown host to route", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
route.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
}
// Authenticate authenticates a request by checking for a session cookie, and validating its expiration,
// clearing the session cookie if it's invalid and returning an error if necessary..
func (p *Proxy) Authenticate(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (err error) {
// Clear the session cookie if anything goes wrong.
defer func() {
if err != nil {
p.sessionStore.ClearSession(rw, req)
}
}()
requestLog := log.WithRequest(req, "proxy.Authenticate")
session, err := p.sessionStore.LoadSession(req)
if err != nil {
// We loaded a cookie but it wasn't valid, clear it, and reject the request
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Msg("error authenticating user")
return err
}
// Lifetime period is the entire duration in which the session is valid.
// This should be set to something like 14 to 30 days.
if session.LifetimePeriodExpired() {
requestLog.Warn().Str("user", session.Email).Msg("session lifetime has expired")
return sessions.ErrLifetimeExpired
} else if session.RefreshPeriodExpired() {
// Refresh period is the period in which the access token is valid. This is ultimately
// controlled by the upstream provider and tends to be around 1 hour.
ok, err := p.authenticateClient.RefreshSession(session)
// We failed to refresh the session successfully
// clear the cookie and reject the request
if err != nil {
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Str("user", session.Email).Msg("refreshing session failed")
return err
}
if !ok {
// User is not authorized after refresh
// clear the cookie and reject the request
requestLog.Error().Str("user", session.Email).Msg("not authorized after refreshing session")
return ErrUserNotAuthorized
}
err = p.sessionStore.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
if err != nil {
// We refreshed the session successfully, but failed to save it.
//
// This could be from failing to encode the session properly.
// But, we clear the session cookie and reject the request!
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Str("user", session.Email).Msg("could not save refresh session")
return err
}
} else if session.ValidationPeriodExpired() {
// Validation period has expired, this is the shortest interval we use to
// check for valid requests. This should be set to something like a minute.
// This calls up the provider chain to validate this user is still active
// and hasn't been de-authorized.
ok := p.authenticateClient.ValidateSessionState(session)
if !ok {
// This user is now no longer authorized, or we failed to
// validate the user.
// Clear the cookie and reject the request
requestLog.Error().Str("user", session.Email).Msg("no longer authorized after validation period")
return ErrUserNotAuthorized
}
err = p.sessionStore.SaveSession(rw, req, session)
if err != nil {
// We validated the session successfully, but failed to save it.
// This could be from failing to encode the session properly.
// But, we clear the session cookie and reject the request!
requestLog.Error().Err(err).Str("user", session.Email).Msg("could not save validated session")
return err
}
}
// if !p.EmailValidator(session.Email) {
// requestLog.Error().Str("user", session.Email).Msg("email failed to validate, unauthorized")
// return ErrUserNotAuthorized
// }
//
// todo(bdd) : handled by authorize package
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", session.User)
if p.PassAccessToken && session.AccessToken != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Access-Token", session.AccessToken)
}
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Email", session.Email)
// stash authenticated user so that it can be logged later (see func logRequest)
rw.Header().Set(loggingUserHeader, session.Email)
// This user has been OK'd. Allow the request!
return nil
}
// upstreamTransport is used to ensure that upstreams cannot override the
// security headers applied by sso_proxy
type upstreamTransport struct {
transport *http.Transport
}
// RoundTrip round trips the request and deletes security headers before returning the response.
func (t *upstreamTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
resp, err := t.transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("proxy.RoundTrip")
return nil, err
}
for key := range securityHeaders {
resp.Header.Del(key)
}
return resp, err
}
// Handle constructs a route from the given host string and matches it to the provided http.Handler and UpstreamConfig
func (p *Proxy) Handle(host string, handler http.Handler) {
p.mux[host] = &handler
}
// router attempts to find a route for a request. If a route is successfully matched,
// it returns the route information and a bool value of `true`. If a route can not be matched,
//a nil value for the route and false bool value is returned.
func (p *Proxy) router(req *http.Request) (http.Handler, bool) {
route, ok := p.mux[req.Host]
if ok {
return *route, true
}
return nil, false
}
// GetRedirectURL returns the redirect url for a given Proxy,
// setting the scheme to be https if CookieSecure is true.
func (p *Proxy) GetRedirectURL(host string) *url.URL {
// TODO: Ensure that we only allow valid upstream hosts in redirect URIs
u := p.redirectURL
// Build redirect URI from request host
if u.Scheme == "" {
u.Scheme = "https"
}
u.Host = host
return u
}
func (p *Proxy) redeemCode(host, code string) (*sessions.SessionState, error) {
if code == "" {
return nil, errors.New("missing code")
}
redirectURL := p.GetRedirectURL(host)
s, err := p.authenticateClient.Redeem(redirectURL.String(), code)
if err != nil {
return s, err
}
if s.Email == "" {
return s, errors.New("invalid email address")
}
return s, nil
}