pomerium/internal/cryptutil/sign_test.go
Bobby DeSimone 8d1732582e
authorize: use jwt insead of state struct (#514)
authenticate: unmarshal and verify state from jwt, instead of middleware
authorize: embed opa policy using statik
authorize: have IsAuthorized handle authorization for all routes
authorize: if no signing key is provided, one is generated
authorize: remove IsAdmin grpc endpoint
authorize/client: return authorize decision struct
cmd/pomerium: main logger no longer contains email and group
cryptutil: add ECDSA signing methods
dashboard: have impersonate form show up for all users, but have api gated by authz
docs: fix typo in signed jwt header
encoding/jws: remove unused es256 signer
frontend: namespace static web assets
internal/sessions: remove leeway to match authz policy
proxy:  move signing functionality to authz
proxy: remove jwt attestation from proxy (authZ does now)
proxy: remove non-signed headers from headers
proxy: remove special handling of x-forwarded-host
sessions: do not verify state in middleware
sessions: remove leeway from state to match authz
sessions/{all}: store jwt directly instead of state

Signed-off-by: Bobby DeSimone <bobbydesimone@gmail.com>
2020-03-10 11:19:26 -07:00

60 lines
1 KiB
Go

package cryptutil
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"testing"
)
func TestSign(t *testing.T) {
message := []byte("Hello, world!")
key, err := NewSigningKey()
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
return
}
signature, err := Sign(message, key)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
return
}
if !Verify(message, signature, &key.PublicKey) {
t.Error("signature was not correct")
return
}
message[0] ^= 0xff
if Verify(message, signature, &key.PublicKey) {
t.Error("signature was good for altered message")
}
}
func TestSignWithP384(t *testing.T) {
message := []byte("Hello, world!")
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
return
}
signature, err := Sign(message, key)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
return
}
if !Verify(message, signature, &key.PublicKey) {
t.Error("signature was not correct")
return
}
message[0] ^= 0xff
if Verify(message, signature, &key.PublicKey) {
t.Error("signature was good for altered message")
}
}