authenticate: refactor middleware, logging, and tests (#30)

- Abstract remaining middleware from authenticate into internal.
- Use middleware chaining in authenticate.
- Standardize naming of Request and ResponseWriter to match std lib.
- Add healthcheck / ping as a middleware.
- Internalized wraped_writer package adapted from goji/middleware.
- Fixed indirection issue with reverse proxy map.
This commit is contained in:
Bobby DeSimone 2019-01-25 20:58:50 -08:00 committed by GitHub
parent b9c298d278
commit 7e1d1a7896
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GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
21 changed files with 768 additions and 397 deletions

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@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
// Package middleware provides a standard set of middleware implementations for pomerium.
package middleware // import "github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/middleware"
import (
@ -15,91 +14,76 @@ import (
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/httputil"
)
// SetHeadersOld ensures that every response includes some basic security headers
func SetHeadersOld(h http.Handler, securityHeaders map[string]string) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
for key, val := range securityHeaders {
rw.Header().Set(key, val)
}
h.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
})
}
// SetHeaders ensures that every response includes some basic security headers
func SetHeaders(securityHeaders map[string]string) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
for key, val := range securityHeaders {
rw.Header().Set(key, val)
w.Header().Set(key, val)
}
next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// WithMethods writes an error response if the method of the request is not included.
func WithMethods(f http.HandlerFunc, methods ...string) http.HandlerFunc {
methodMap := make(map[string]struct{}, len(methods))
for _, m := range methods {
methodMap[m] = struct{}{}
}
return func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if _, ok := methodMap[req.Method]; !ok {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, fmt.Sprintf("method %s not allowed", req.Method), http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
f(rw, req)
}
}
// ValidateClientSecret checks the request header for the client secret and returns
// an error if it does not match the proxy client secret
func ValidateClientSecret(f http.HandlerFunc, sharedSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
clientSecret := req.Form.Get("shared_secret")
// check the request header for the client secret
if clientSecret == "" {
clientSecret = req.Header.Get("X-Client-Secret")
}
func ValidateClientSecret(sharedSecret string) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
clientSecret := r.Form.Get("shared_secret")
// check the request header for the client secret
if clientSecret == "" {
clientSecret = r.Header.Get("X-Client-Secret")
}
if clientSecret != sharedSecret {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, "Invalid client secret", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
f(rw, req)
if clientSecret != sharedSecret {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, "Invalid client secret", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// ValidateRedirectURI checks the redirect uri in the query parameters and ensures that
// the url's domain is one in the list of proxy root domains.
func ValidateRedirectURI(f http.HandlerFunc, proxyRootDomains []string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
redirectURI := req.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
if !validRedirectURI(redirectURI, proxyRootDomains) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, "Invalid redirect parameter", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
f(rw, req)
// the its domain is in the list of proxy root domains.
func ValidateRedirectURI(proxyRootDomains []string) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
redirectURI := r.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
if !ValidRedirectURI(redirectURI, proxyRootDomains) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, "Invalid redirect parameter", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
func validRedirectURI(uri string, rootDomains []string) bool {
// ValidRedirectURI checks if a URL's domain is one in the list of proxy root domains.
func ValidRedirectURI(uri string, rootDomains []string) bool {
if uri == "" || len(rootDomains) == 0 {
return false
}
redirectURL, err := url.Parse(uri)
if uri == "" || err != nil || redirectURL.Host == "" {
if err != nil || redirectURL.Host == "" {
return false
}
for _, domain := range rootDomains {
if domain == "" {
return false
}
if strings.HasSuffix(redirectURL.Hostname(), domain) {
return true
}
@ -109,35 +93,36 @@ func validRedirectURI(uri string, rootDomains []string) bool {
// ValidateSignature ensures the request is valid and has been signed with
// the correspdoning client secret key
func ValidateSignature(f http.HandlerFunc, sharedSecret string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
err := req.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
redirectURI := req.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
sigVal := req.Form.Get("sig")
timestamp := req.Form.Get("ts")
if !validSignature(redirectURI, sigVal, timestamp, sharedSecret) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, "Invalid redirect parameter", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
func ValidateSignature(sharedSecret string) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
err := r.ParseForm()
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
redirectURI := r.Form.Get("redirect_uri")
sigVal := r.Form.Get("sig")
timestamp := r.Form.Get("ts")
if !ValidSignature(redirectURI, sigVal, timestamp, sharedSecret) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, "Cross service signature failed to validate", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
f(rw, req)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// ValidateHost ensures that each request's host is valid
func ValidateHost(mux map[string]*http.Handler) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
func ValidateHost(mux map[string]http.Handler) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if _, ok := mux[req.Host]; !ok {
httputil.ErrorResponse(rw, req, "Unknown host to route", http.StatusNotFound)
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if _, ok := mux[r.Host]; !ok {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, "Unknown host to route", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
@ -145,25 +130,47 @@ func ValidateHost(mux map[string]*http.Handler) func(next http.Handler) http.Han
// RequireHTTPS reroutes a HTTP request to HTTPS
// todo(bdd) : this is unreliable unless behind another reverser proxy
// todo(bdd) : header age seems extreme
func RequireHTTPS(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
rw.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000")
func RequireHTTPS(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000")
// todo(bdd) : scheme and x-forwarded-proto cannot be trusted if not behind another load balancer
if (req.URL.Scheme == "http" && req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "http") || &req.TLS == nil {
if (r.URL.Scheme == "http" && r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "http") || &r.TLS == nil {
dest := &url.URL{
Scheme: "https",
Host: req.Host,
Path: req.URL.Path,
RawQuery: req.URL.RawQuery,
Host: r.Host,
Path: r.URL.Path,
RawQuery: r.URL.RawQuery,
}
http.Redirect(rw, req, dest.String(), http.StatusMovedPermanently)
http.Redirect(w, r, dest.String(), http.StatusMovedPermanently)
return
}
h.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
func validSignature(redirectURI, sigVal, timestamp, secret string) bool {
// Healthcheck endpoint middleware useful to setting up a path like
// `/ping` that load balancers or uptime testing external services
// can make a request before hitting any routes. It's also convenient
// to place this above ACL middlewares as well.
func Healthcheck(endpoint, msg string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
f := func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == "GET" && strings.EqualFold(r.URL.Path, endpoint) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(msg))
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
}
return f
}
// ValidSignature checks to see if a signature is valid. Compares hmac of
// redirect uri, timestamp, and secret and signature.
func ValidSignature(redirectURI, sigVal, timestamp, secret string) bool {
if redirectURI == "" || sigVal == "" || timestamp == "" || secret == "" {
return false
}