authenticate: make service http only

- Rename SessionState to State to avoid stutter.
- Simplified option validation to use a wrapper function for base64 secrets.
- Removed authenticates grpc code.
- Abstracted logic to load and validate a user's authenticate session.
- Removed instances of url.Parse in favor of urlutil's version.
- proxy: replaces grpc refresh logic with forced deadline advancement.
- internal/sessions: remove rest store; parse authorize header as part of session store.
- proxy: refactor request signer
- sessions: remove extend deadline (fixes #294)
- remove AuthenticateInternalAddr
- remove AuthenticateInternalAddrString
- omit type tag.Key from declaration of vars TagKey* it will be inferred
  from the right-hand side
- remove compatibility package xerrors
- use cloned http.DefaultTransport as base transport
This commit is contained in:
Bobby DeSimone 2019-08-29 22:12:29 -07:00
parent bc72d08ad4
commit 380d314404
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: AEE4CF12FE86D07E
53 changed files with 718 additions and 2280 deletions

View file

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/middleware"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/sessions"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/templates"
"github.com/pomerium/pomerium/internal/urlutil"
)
// StateParameter holds the redirect id along with the session id.
@ -36,9 +37,9 @@ func (p *Proxy) Handler() http.Handler {
mux.HandleFunc("/.pomerium", p.UserDashboard)
mux.HandleFunc("/.pomerium/impersonate", p.Impersonate) // POST
mux.HandleFunc("/.pomerium/sign_out", p.SignOut)
// handlers handlers with validation
mux.Handle("/.pomerium/callback", validate.ThenFunc(p.OAuthCallback))
mux.Handle("/.pomerium/refresh", validate.ThenFunc(p.Refresh))
// handlers with validation
mux.Handle("/.pomerium/callback", validate.ThenFunc(p.AuthenticateCallback))
mux.Handle("/.pomerium/refresh", validate.ThenFunc(p.ForceRefresh))
mux.Handle("/", validate.ThenFunc(p.Proxy))
return mux
}
@ -60,12 +61,12 @@ func (p *Proxy) SignOut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
uri, err := url.Parse(r.Form.Get("redirect_uri"))
uri, err := urlutil.ParseAndValidateURL(r.Form.Get("redirect_uri"))
if err == nil && uri.String() != "" {
redirectURL = uri
}
default:
uri, err := url.Parse(r.URL.Query().Get("redirect_uri"))
uri, err := urlutil.ParseAndValidateURL(r.URL.Query().Get("redirect_uri"))
if err == nil && uri.String() != "" {
redirectURL = uri
}
@ -76,24 +77,20 @@ func (p *Proxy) SignOut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// OAuthStart begins the authenticate flow, encrypting the redirect url
// in a request to the provider's sign in endpoint.
func (p *Proxy) OAuthStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// create a CSRF value used to mitigate replay attacks.
state := &StateParameter{
SessionID: fmt.Sprintf("%x", cryptutil.GenerateKey()),
RedirectURI: r.URL.String(),
}
// Encrypt, and save CSRF state. Will be checked on callback.
localState, err := p.cipher.Marshal(state)
// Encrypt CSRF + redirect_uri and store in csrf session. Validated on callback.
csrfState, err := p.cipher.Marshal(state)
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
p.csrfStore.SetCSRF(w, r, localState)
p.csrfStore.SetCSRF(w, r, csrfState)
// Though the plaintext payload is identical, we re-encrypt which will
// create a different cipher text using another nonce
remoteState, err := p.cipher.Marshal(state)
paramState, err := p.cipher.Marshal(state)
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
@ -101,68 +98,55 @@ func (p *Proxy) OAuthStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Sanity check. The encrypted payload of local and remote state should
// never match as each encryption round uses a cryptographic nonce.
//
// todo(bdd): since this should nearly (1/(2^32*2^32)) never happen should
// we panic as a failure most likely means the rands entropy source is failing?
if remoteState == localState {
p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error("encrypted state should not match", http.StatusBadRequest, nil))
return
}
// if paramState == csrfState {
// httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error("encrypted state should not match", http.StatusBadRequest, nil))
// return
// }
signinURL := p.GetSignInURL(p.authenticateURL, p.GetRedirectURL(r.Host), remoteState)
log.FromRequest(r).Debug().Str("SigninURL", signinURL.String()).Msg("proxy: oauth start")
signinURL := p.GetSignInURL(p.authenticateURL, p.GetRedirectURL(r.Host), paramState)
// Redirect the user to the authenticate service along with the encrypted
// state which contains a redirect uri back to the proxy and a nonce
http.Redirect(w, r, signinURL.String(), http.StatusFound)
}
// OAuthCallback validates the cookie sent back from the authenticate service. This function will
// contain an error, or it will contain a `code`; the code can be used to fetch an access token, and
// other metadata, from the authenticator.
// finish the oauth cycle
func (p *Proxy) OAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// AuthenticateCallback checks the state parameter to make sure it matches the
// local csrf state then redirects the user back to the original intended route.
func (p *Proxy) AuthenticateCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
if callbackError := r.Form.Get("error"); callbackError != "" {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error(callbackError, http.StatusBadRequest, nil))
return
}
// Encrypted CSRF passed from authenticate service
remoteStateEncrypted := r.Form.Get("state")
remoteStatePlain := new(StateParameter)
if err := p.cipher.Unmarshal(remoteStateEncrypted, remoteStatePlain); err != nil {
var remoteStatePlain StateParameter
if err := p.cipher.Unmarshal(remoteStateEncrypted, &remoteStatePlain); err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
// Encrypted CSRF from session storage
c, err := p.csrfStore.GetCSRF(r)
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
p.csrfStore.ClearCSRF(w, r)
localStateEncrypted := c.Value
localStatePlain := new(StateParameter)
err = p.cipher.Unmarshal(localStateEncrypted, localStatePlain)
var localStatePlain StateParameter
err = p.cipher.Unmarshal(localStateEncrypted, &localStatePlain)
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
// If the encrypted value of local and remote state match, reject.
// Likely a replay attack or nonce-reuse.
// assert no nonce reuse
if remoteStateEncrypted == localStateEncrypted {
p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error("local and remote state should not match!", http.StatusBadRequest, nil))
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r,
httputil.Error("local and remote state", http.StatusBadRequest,
fmt.Errorf("possible nonce-reuse / replay attack")))
return
}
@ -205,13 +189,23 @@ func isCORSPreflight(r *http.Request) bool {
r.Header.Get("Origin") != ""
}
func (p *Proxy) loadExistingSession(r *http.Request) (*sessions.State, error) {
s, err := p.sessionStore.LoadSession(r)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("proxy: invalid session: %w", err)
}
if err := s.Valid(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("proxy: invalid state: %w", err)
}
return s, nil
}
// Proxy authenticates a request, either proxying the request if it is authenticated,
// or starting the authenticate service for validation if not.
func (p *Proxy) Proxy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// does a route exist for this request?
route, ok := p.router(r)
if !ok {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error(fmt.Sprintf("%s is not a managed route.", r.Host), http.StatusNotFound, nil))
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error("", http.StatusNotFound, nil))
return
}
@ -221,30 +215,17 @@ func (p *Proxy) Proxy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
s, err := p.restStore.LoadSession(r)
// if authorization bearer token does not exist or fails, use cookie store
if err != nil || s == nil {
s, err = p.sessionStore.LoadSession(r)
if err != nil {
log.FromRequest(r).Debug().Str("cause", err.Error()).Msg("proxy: invalid session, re-authenticating")
p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
p.OAuthStart(w, r)
return
}
}
if err = p.authenticate(w, r, s); err != nil {
p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error("User unauthenticated", http.StatusUnauthorized, err))
s, err := p.loadExistingSession(r)
if err != nil {
log.Debug().Str("cause", err.Error()).Msg("proxy: bad authN session, redirecting")
p.OAuthStart(w, r)
return
}
authorized, err := p.AuthorizeClient.Authorize(r.Context(), r.Host, s)
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
if !authorized {
} else if !authorized {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error(fmt.Sprintf("%s is not authorized for this route", s.Email), http.StatusForbidden, nil))
return
}
@ -259,20 +240,13 @@ func (p *Proxy) Proxy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// It also contains certain administrative actions like user impersonation.
// Nota bene: This endpoint does authentication, not authorization.
func (p *Proxy) UserDashboard(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
session, err := p.sessionStore.LoadSession(r)
session, err := p.loadExistingSession(r)
if err != nil {
log.FromRequest(r).Debug().Str("cause", err.Error()).Msg("proxy: no session, redirecting to auth")
p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
log.Debug().Str("cause", err.Error()).Msg("proxy: bad authN session, redirecting")
p.OAuthStart(w, r)
return
}
if err := p.authenticate(w, r, session); err != nil {
p.sessionStore.ClearSession(w, r)
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error("User unauthenticated", http.StatusUnauthorized, err))
return
}
redirectURL := &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: r.Host, Path: "/.pomerium/sign_out"}
isAdmin, err := p.AuthorizeClient.IsAdmin(r.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
@ -314,13 +288,14 @@ func (p *Proxy) UserDashboard(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
templates.New().ExecuteTemplate(w, "dashboard.html", t)
}
// Refresh redeems and extends an existing authenticated oidc session with
// ForceRefresh redeems and extends an existing authenticated oidc session with
// the underlying identity provider. All session details including groups,
// timeouts, will be renewed.
func (p *Proxy) Refresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
session, err := p.sessionStore.LoadSession(r)
func (p *Proxy) ForceRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
session, err := p.loadExistingSession(r)
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
log.Debug().Str("cause", err.Error()).Msg("proxy: bad authN session, redirecting")
p.OAuthStart(w, r)
return
}
iss, err := session.IssuedAt()
@ -332,16 +307,13 @@ func (p *Proxy) Refresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// reject a refresh if it's been less than the refresh cooldown to prevent abuse
if time.Since(iss) < p.refreshCooldown {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r,
httputil.Error(fmt.Sprintf("Session must be %s old before refreshing", p.refreshCooldown), http.StatusBadRequest, nil))
httputil.Error(
fmt.Sprintf("Session must be %s old before refreshing", p.refreshCooldown),
http.StatusBadRequest, nil))
return
}
newSession, err := p.AuthenticateClient.Refresh(r.Context(), session)
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
if err = p.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, newSession); err != nil {
session.ForceRefresh()
if err = p.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, session); err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
@ -357,12 +329,12 @@ func (p *Proxy) Impersonate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
}
session, err := p.sessionStore.LoadSession(r)
session, err := p.loadExistingSession(r)
if err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
log.Debug().Str("cause", err.Error()).Msg("proxy: bad authN session, redirecting")
p.OAuthStart(w, r)
return
}
// authorization check -- is this user an admin?
isAdmin, err := p.AuthorizeClient.IsAdmin(r.Context(), session)
if err != nil || !isAdmin {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, httputil.Error(fmt.Sprintf("%s is not an administrator", session.Email), http.StatusForbidden, err))
@ -376,7 +348,7 @@ func (p *Proxy) Impersonate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
p.csrfStore.ClearCSRF(w, r)
encryptedCSRF := c.Value
decryptedCSRF := new(StateParameter)
var decryptedCSRF StateParameter
if err = p.cipher.Unmarshal(encryptedCSRF, decryptedCSRF); err != nil {
httputil.ErrorResponse(w, r, err)
return
@ -398,26 +370,6 @@ func (p *Proxy) Impersonate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/.pomerium", http.StatusFound)
}
// Authenticate authenticates a request by checking for a session cookie, and validating its expiration,
// clearing the session cookie if it's invalid and returning an error if necessary..
func (p *Proxy) authenticate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, s *sessions.SessionState) error {
if s.RefreshPeriodExpired() {
s, err := p.AuthenticateClient.Refresh(r.Context(), s)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("proxy: session refresh failed : %v", err)
}
if err := p.sessionStore.SaveSession(w, r, s); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("proxy: refresh failed : %v", err)
}
} else {
valid, err := p.AuthenticateClient.Validate(r.Context(), s.IDToken)
if err != nil || !valid {
return fmt.Errorf("proxy: session validate failed: %v : %v", valid, err)
}
}
return nil
}
// router attempts to find a route for a request. If a route is successfully matched,
// it returns the route information and a bool value of `true`. If a route can
// not be matched, a nil value for the route and false bool value is returned.
@ -461,7 +413,7 @@ func (p *Proxy) GetSignInURL(authenticateURL, redirectURL *url.URL, state string
a := authenticateURL.ResolveReference(&url.URL{Path: "/sign_in"})
now := time.Now()
rawRedirect := redirectURL.String()
params, _ := url.ParseQuery(a.RawQuery)
params, _ := url.ParseQuery(a.RawQuery) // handled by ServeMux
params.Set("redirect_uri", rawRedirect)
params.Set("shared_secret", p.SharedKey)
params.Set("response_type", "code")
@ -477,7 +429,7 @@ func (p *Proxy) GetSignOutURL(authenticateURL, redirectURL *url.URL) *url.URL {
a := authenticateURL.ResolveReference(&url.URL{Path: "/sign_out"})
now := time.Now()
rawRedirect := redirectURL.String()
params, _ := url.ParseQuery(a.RawQuery)
params, _ := url.ParseQuery(a.RawQuery) // handled by ServeMux
params.Add("redirect_uri", rawRedirect)
params.Set("ts", fmt.Sprint(now.Unix()))
params.Set("sig", p.signRedirectURL(rawRedirect, now))